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TECHNOLOGY LAW-GREAT GOOGLE-Y MOOGLEY: THE EFFECT AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CLICK FRAUD AND ONLINE ADVERTISING
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising increasingly provides the economic foundation for
free press and speech.' It benefits consumers and helps small businesses
succeed.2 Online advertising eclipsed radio advertising in 2007, and by
2011 it is projected to surpass television revenues. 3 Online marketing, or-
ders, and delivery are commercial communications between private individ-
uals or commercial entities that take place via electronic networks in elec-
tronic commerce (e-commerce).4 Click fraud negatively impacts e-
commerce by hindering advertisers' trust, reliance, and profitability on the
use and effectiveness of Internet marketing.
Click fraud describes a range of behaviors that generate clicks on In-
ternet advertisements that are not made by potential interested customers,
but by people or automated programs for ulterior purposes. These clicks
1. An Examination of the Google Doubleclick Merger and the Online Advertising
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (referring to comments made
by Bradford L. Smith, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary of
Microsoft, Inc., and David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and
Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.).
2. Id.
3. Id. A study by Veronis Suhler, a private equity company focusing on media and
communications information, estimates that Internet advertising's success is due to its tar-
geted, relevant, and measurable approach. Id. Other media forms do not have the same capa-
bilities for searching out consumers. Id.
4. COMPUTER LAW: THE LAW AND REGULATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 198
(Chris Reed & John Angel eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter COMPUTER
LAW].
5. See Lambotte v. IAC/Interactive Corp., No. CV 08-04263, 2008 WL 4829882, at *1
n. 1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2008) (citing plaintiff's complaint) (defining click fraud as "purpose-
ful clicks on advertisements by someone other than a potential customer"); Brodsky v. Ya-
hoo! Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing plaintiff's complaint) (defin-
ing click fraud as an "activity under taken for the sole purpose of causing Yahoo! or another
search marketing business to log a click which generates a payment due from an advertiser");
NetQuote, Inc. v. Byrd, No. 07-cv-00630-DME-MEH, 2008 WL 2552871, at *13 (D. Colo.
June 17, 2008) (citing defendant's counterclaim) ("[C]lick fraud occurs when 'a person im-
itates a legitimate user of a web browser clicking on an ad, for the purpose of generating a
charge per click without having actual interest in the target of the ad's link."'); Feldman v.
Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (E.D. Penn. 2007) ("Click fraud occurs when entities
or persons, such as competitors or pranksters, without any interest [in the website's] services,
click repeatedly on [an] ad, the result of which drives up [the advertiser's] cost and discou-
rages . . . advertising. Click fraud may also be referred to as 'improper clicks' or 'trick
clicks."'); In re Miva, Inc., Sec. Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (defin-
ing click fraud as "the illicit methods of creating Internet traffic ... advertisers were not
forwarded legitimate leads of consumers interested in acquiring their products"); Interactive
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increase prices for the advertiser without providing the corresponding com-
mercial benefit that the advertisers expect.6 Malicious clicks-those made
intentionally to defraud a consumer, an advertiser, or the online communi-
ty-may purposefully generate money for the offending party or, alterna-
tively, may eliminate a competitor's advertising budget.7 Google, Inc.
(Google) has defined click fraud as the intentional clicking of an online
advertisement for a reason "other than to view the underlying content.",
8
Click fraud is an international problem causing a legal stir in the Unit-
ed States. The largest click fraud settlement took place in 2005 in Texarka-
na, Arkansas,9 when Google paid $90 million in a class action attempt to
recoup advertisers' lost dollars.' 0 The advancement of technology and en-
hanced online commercial dependency necessitates the creation of strict
regulations and legal precedent to protect merchants, consumers, and the
online marketplace from fraudulent activity. Civil litigation is insufficient to
combat the negative impact that click fraud has on e-commerce. Click fraud
should be regulated through defined criminal standards and enforceable
methods involving coordinated efforts of the government, private industry,
and the public sector.
Retail Mgmt., Inc. v. Microsoft Online, L.P., 988 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(citing plaintiff's complaint) (defining click fraud as "improperly charg[ing] ... merchants
for clicks that had not been generated by prospective customers").
6. See, e.g., Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 231-32. The plaintiff was a lawyer who
purchased advertising from Google to attract potential clients but instead claimed to be
charged for fraudulent clicks. Id. He alleged that although he was originally a member of the
class action suit in Arkansas, see Lane's Gifts discussion infra Part II.C.5, he timely opted
out in order to pursue an individual action. Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
7. See Payday Advance Plus, Inc. v. Findwhat.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing plaintiff's complaint). The defendant allegedly hired people to click
on certain advertising links to increase revenues. Id.
8. Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000l19312507044494/dlOk.htm [herei-
nafter 2007 Annual Report].
9. Miller County, Arkansas was placed on the American Tort Reform Foundation's
watch list for "judicial hellholes" in 2006. AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES 22 (2006), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2006/. Miller
County saw an increase in major class action lawsuits prior to the enactment of the federal
Class Action Fairness Act. Id. It has been considered one of the most "plaintiff-friendly"
jurisdictions in the country, which has created a legal environment that encourages compa-
nies to settle rather than going to trial. Id. The Google case was just one in a string of major
million dollar settlements. Id. The Google case settled for $90 million, Miller County attor-
neys received $30 million in fees, and the class of plaintiffs only received coupons for future
advertising. Id.
10. Final Order and Judgment Approving Settlement, Certifying Class for Settlement
Purposes, Awarding Class Counsel Attorneys' Fees and Dismissing Action with Prejudice at
7, Lane's Gifts and Collectibles v. Yahoo!, Inc. and Google, Inc., No. CV-2005-52-1 (Cir.
Ct. Miller County, Ark. Jul. 27, 2006).
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In determining the effect of click fraud on e-commerce advertising,
this note will identify and explain the concept and origins of click fraud.ll It
will then demonstrate the effect of current click fraud settlements and pend-
ing cases as well as the application of Internet and e-commerce law. 12 Next,
this note will analyze both civil and criminal litigation tactics, 3 and finally,
it will propose guidelines for potential enforcement solutions to regulate
click fraud.14
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Essence of Internet Advertising
Historically, Internet websites primarily used display-based advertis-
ing, such as pop-up ads or banner ads. 5 Google sought to create a more
effective, yet unassuming, advertisement geared toward meeting the de-
mands of a niche market. 16 In applying its search principles and building
from advertising models used by other search engine companies, Google
specialized in search-based advertisement, developing two major advertis-
ing forums-AdWords and AdSense.
17
1. AdWords
Google's search-based Internet advertising program, AdWords, con-
sists of text-only ads triggered by specific search queries and results pat-
terned after the simplistic design and approach of old-fashioned newspaper
advertisements. 18 The ads are distinctly separated from the search results
("organic links") under a heading entitled "Sponsored Links."'19
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part III.A, B.
13. See discussion infra Part III.A, B.
14. See discussion infra Part III.C.
15. Rick E. Bruner, The Decade in Online Advertising: 1994-2004 3 (2005), available
at http://www.doubleclick.com/insight/pdfs/dcdecaderinonline_0504.pdf (research report
compiled by DoubleClick, Inc.). DoubleClick, Inc. is the market-leader in Internet marketing
and advertising data collection. AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNET AND THE LAW: TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIETY, AND COMPROMISES 116-17 (2006).
16. DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, INSIDE THE HOTTEST BUSINESS, MEDIA AND
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS OF OUR TIME: THE GOOGLE STORY 117-18 (2005).
17. See Google AdWords Help: What is Google AdWords?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.pyanswer=6084&to (last visited Mar. 8,
2009).
18. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 86, 89. At the time, GoTo.com was the key
Internet advertisement provider, supplying advertisements that appeared with search results
on other search engines. Id. at 87. See also Neil Daswani et al., Online Advertising Fraud, in
CRIMEWARE: UNDERSTANDING NEW ATTACKS AND DEFENSES § 11.2.2 (Markus Jakobsson &
20101
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Advertising in traditional media forms is costly, making it an exclusive
club for major companies. 2' Google's advertising scheme creates equality in
the marketplace, allowing local businesses to compete with Fortune 500
companies. 21 Google's advertisements are only revealed to potential cus-
tomers in the market for a related specific need or those in a particular geo-
graphic location.22 The AdWords theory depends upon the idea that the
searcher would come to the advertiser, much like in a newspaper or adver-
tising on cable television.23
AdWords allows advertisers to link keywords to their advertisements
so that a search query yields an advertisement for a related product.24 For
instance, a person "googling" 25 "toaster ovens" may find advertisements for
Black & Decker (a toaster oven manufacturer), Sears, Target, and Macy's
(retailers that sell toaster ovens). AdWords ads are listed in order of relev-
ance, not price.26 The highest priced ad does not necessarily appear at the
Zulfikar Ramzan, eds., 2008). After studying GoTo.com's methodology, Google's founders,
Sergey Brin and Larry Page, decided they could create their own ads to save money. VISE &
MALSEED, supra note 16, at 87-88. The key to their advertising success, however, would be
making it clear that the ads would not bias the search results. Id. at 88-89.
19. Google Corporate Information: Our Philosophy,
http://www.google.com/corporate/tenthings.htmnl (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
20. For example, the average cost for a thirty-second spot during the 2009 Super Bowl
was $3 million. Laura Petrecca and Theresa Howard, Super Bowl Commercials Will Still Go
for Laughs in 2009, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 2009, at 3B, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/adtrack/2009-01-18-super-bowl-commercials_
N.htm. In 2008, an ad cost $2.7 million. Id.
21. VISE &MALSEED, supra note 16, at 117.
22. ALEXANDER TUZHILIN, THE LANE'S GIFTS v. GOOGLE REPORT § 7.1, available at
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/pdf/TuzhilinReport.pdf (determining that search engines, as
a whole, make reasonable efforts with state of the art methods to ensure that their customers
do not become victims of click fraud). The report was prepared by a click fraud expert and
relied upon in the Lane's Gifts case, according to Stephen Malouf, plaintiff's lead counsel,
and as stated in Final Order and Judgment Approving Settlement, Certifying Class for Set-
tlement Purposes, Awarding Class Counsel Attorneys' Fees and Dismissing Action with
Prejudice at 2, Lane's Gifts and Collectibles v. Yahoo!, Inc. and Google, Inc., No. CV-2005-
52-1 (Cir. Ct. Miller County, Ark. Jul. 27, 2006).
23. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 117-18.
24. See Google AdWords Help: What is a Maximum CPC?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer= 10188 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
25. "Googling" is a verb associated with searching to obtain information on
Google.com. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary: Googling,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/googling (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Although
"googling" has a history of being used in reference to finding anything, anywhere on the
Web, Google, Inc. has urged the public to only use the term when actually using their ser-
vice. E-mail from Paul McFedries, Google trademark counsel, to American Dialect Society
(Feb. 24, 2003, 22:28:22).
26. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 90. PageRank is a process used by Google for
tracking a website's popularity by counting the number of links that direct users to a site. Id.
at 37. Google uses PageRank in web searches to return prioritized results based on relevance.
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top of the page.27 Google's advertising system allows its users to rank the
ads, making the most clicked ads the most relevant.28 The most relevant ads
appear at the top of the page. 29 Search-based advertising accounted for ap-
proximately $5.1 billion in 2005, 41% of total Internet advertising reve-
nue.30 In 2008, interactive advertising amounted to $300 billion in economic
activity. 31 Since the creation of the AdWords program in 2002, Google ex-
perienced a 409% revenue growth rate in 2002 and a 234% revenue growth
rate in 2003.32 Both Google's total revenue and total advertising revenue
continue to increase through 2009. 33
2. AdSense
As AdWords became more successful, Google was able to create an af-
filiate progran--AdSense-which enabled other web sites, such as AOL,
EarthLink, HowStuffWorks, and Blogger, to buy Google's ads to place on
their websites.34 There are two ways for website publishers to participate in
Id. at 37-39. Unlike other search engines that simply match words in queries to words found
on a web page, Google uses PageRank to put search results in a logical order for users. Id.
The same theory is applied to Google's advertising scheme. Id. Google's co-founders were
originally convinced that advertising on search engines led to biased results and an impure
PageRank-they recognized that advertising income often provides an incentive to provide
poor quality search results and an inclination to simply direct users to advertising partners.
Id. Advertising is also a means to fund Google's goal of organizing the world's information
and making it universally accessible and useful in an impartial manner. Id. See also SERGEY
BRIN & LAWRENCE PAGE, THE ANATOMY OF A LARGE-SCALE HYPERTEXTUAL WEB SEARCH
ENGINE 8 app.a (1998), available at http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/1/1998-8.pdf (report
written by Brin and Page while graduate students at Stanford detailing their new internet
program, Google).
27. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 90.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, lAB INTERNET ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT 8
(2006), available at
http://www.iab.net/media/file/resources adrevenue_pdfIABPWC_2005.pdf. For a descrip-
tion of LAB, see infra notes 167-68.
31. HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, INC. WITH DR. JOHN DEIGHTON AND DR. JOHN QUELCH,
LAB: ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING-SUPPORTED INTERNET ECOSYSTEM, June 10,
2009, available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/Economic-Value-Report.pdf.
32. See Press Release, Google, Inc., Google Introduces New Pricing for Popular Self-
Service Online Advertising Program (Feb. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.google.com/press/
pressrel/select.html. See also GOOGLE, INC., 2004 INCOME STATEMENT (2005), available at
http://investor.google.com/fin data.html.
33. GOOGLE, INC., 2009 INCOME INCOME STATEMENT (2009), available at
http://investor.google.com/fin data.html. In 2008, Google experienced a 31% revenue
growth and a 29% total advertising revenue growth. Id.
34. Google AdWords Help: What is Google AdWords,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6084 (last visited Mar. 8,
2010]
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the AdSense program: AdSense for search and AdSense for content.35 Ad-
Sense for search allows Google to place its ads on individual publishers'
websites. 36 When a user inputs keyword-based searches on a publisher's
site, the search results pages will contain Google ads that fit the theme of
the publisher's website. 
7
AdSensefor content is a system that automatically delivers targeted ads
to a publisher's web page.38 The ads are based on the content of the visited
pages and the geographical location of the user, determined by an Internet
Protocol Address (IP address). 39 These ads are usually preceded by the
heading "Ads by Google. ' 4° Google displays ads on a publisher's website
that are relevant to the user, while also providing ads that will trigger clicks
to maximize revenues. 41 Ironically-for a company that was initially op-
posed to advertising-ninety-nine percent of Google's current revenue is
derived from AdWords and AdSense.42
B. Payment Methods for Online Advertising
Google's AdWords program uses a payment method similar to most
other Internet advertising schemes. AdWords is based on the Pay-Per-Click
(PPC) method (sometimes referred to the Cost-Per-Click (CPC) method),
which allows an advertiser to pay only when a visitor clicks on its ad.43 In
2009).
35. TuZHILIN, supra note 22, at § 7.2.
36. Id. See also Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.2.2.
37. TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at § 7.2.
38. Id.
39. Id. An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is "the ten-digit identification tag used
by computers to locate specific websites." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (8th ed. 2004).
40. TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at § 7.2.
41. Id. at 11.
42. 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 20. Click fraud uses AdWords to corrupt
advertising revenues through false clicking. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d
229, 232 (E.D. Penn. 2007). AdSense is essentially infiltrated in the same manner, except
individual publishers initiate the false clicks to increase revenues garnered from advertising
on their personal websites using Google advertisements. See generally discussion supra Part
II.A.I, 2. See also TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at § 12.
43. TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at § 8. Other payment methods include the Cost-Per-Mille
or Cost-Per-Impression (CPM) and the Cost-Per-Action (CPA) models. Id. at § 7. The CPM
method allows an advertiser to pay per one thousand impressions of the ad. Id. An impres-
sion occurs each time a Google search result is displayed for an item. Daswani, et al., supra
note 18, at § 11.2.1. In the CPA method, an advertiser pays when a certain conversion action
takes place, such as a product being purchased online, an advertised item is placed into a
shopping cart, or an online form is filled out. TuZi-m i, supra note 22, at § 7. From the ad-
vertisers' point of view, this is the most effective type of advertisement payment plan be-
cause it ensures that the advertisement actually targeted a customer who reacted positively to
the advertisement. Id.
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using a PPC method, Google sets its per-click price using an auction sys-
tem, which collects advertising payments contingent upon the validation of
clicks. 44 Each advertiser bids according to how much it is willing to pay per
click for a particular keyword.a5 Other advertisers vie for the same keyword,
causing the price per click to increase. 4 An advertisement's page position is
based on the price a company is willing to pay in the auction and the ad's
popularity, or how frequently it is clicked.4 7
C. The Challenge of Click Fraud
Google's PPC advertising scheme has become susceptible to corrup-
tion through click fraud.48 Click fraud-clicks made by people or automated
programs for ulterior purposes--drives up prices for the advertiser without
providing the corresponding commercial benefit that the advertisers ex-
pect.49
1. Types of Click Fraud
There are typically three different types of clicks: valid, invalid, and
malicious.5 0 A click is typically categorized based on the intended action
and purpose of the clicker.5'
Valid clicks occur when a consumer in the online marketplace clicks
on a sponsored link or advertisement with the intent to gain additional in-
formation or to purchase goods.52 Valid clicks are the basis for intended
online advertising profit.53
Invalid clicks consist of accidental or unintended double clicks, web
browser errors, or a consumer clicking on a link and using the "back" button
to retrieve something previously viewed.54 Click fraud does not include
44. Google AdSense Terms and Conditions, https://www.google.com/adsenseiiocalized-
terms (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). The auction system was originally created by Overture, an
Internet advertising company who supplied Yahoo! with its ads. VISE & MALSEED, supra
note 16,at 115-16.
45. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 115-16. Google's only price-setting guideline is
that the minimum bid must be five cents. Id. at 117.
46. Id. at 115-16.
47. Id. at 117.
48. Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.2.2.
49. See supra notes 5-6.
50. See TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at §§ 16-18. See also Daswani et al., supra note 18, at
§ 11.3.2.
51. See TUZHILIN,supra note 22, at §§ 16-17. See also Daswani et al., supra note 18, at
§ 11.3.2.
52. See TuZHILIN, supra note 22, at § 17.
53. See id.
54. Id. at §§ 16-17.
2010]
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invalid clicks, although they are tracked because they may skew click fraud
statistical data.55
The third type of click is the foundation of click fraud. Malicious
clicks are made intentionally to defraud a consumer, an advertiser, or the
online community with the purpose of generating money for an individual
or company or for eliminating a competitor's advertising budget by falsely
using paid clicks. 6 Google has defined click fraud as the intentional click-
ing of an online advertisement for a reason "other than to view the underly-
ing content.,
57
2. The Adverse Effects of Click Fraud and How Click Fraud is
Perpetrated
Fraudulent clicking activity eliminates a company's advertising budg-
et, causing a search engine to eliminate an ad once the PPC limit is
reached.5 8 As a result, a competitor is able to purchase the previously elimi-
nated advertising keyword and ad position for a lower price.59
Malicious clicks originate from three basic sources: business competi-
tors, individual publishers, and clickbots.60 Business competitors are the
most common click fraud perpetrators. For example, Company #1 commits
X dollars per month to Google for advertising on a PPC basis. Every time
someone clicks on the company's ad, money is deducted from its AdWords
account. Eventually, the company will reach its maximum amount of paid
clicks, and its ad will be eliminated until more PPC advertising is pur-
chased.
55. Id.
56. See id. at § 17. See also Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.3.2.
57. 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 25.
58. Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.3.2.; Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d
229, 232 (E.D. Penn. 2007) ("The price per keyword is determined by a bidding process,
wherein the highest bidder for a keyword would have its ad placed at the top of the list of
results from a Google.com search by an internet user.").
59. See TuzHILN, supra note 22, at §§ 10, 18.
60. Id. at §§ 17-18; Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.4. The five major classes of
invalid clicks that affect advertising profits include: 1) Bad Spiders: clicks inadvertently
made by a webcrawler while gathering Internet pages for search engines; 2) Speed Demons:
clicks arising from Internet service providers or wireless devices because the system works
too slow and an impatient user clicks multiple times; 3) Commission Collectors: clicks made
by individuals to gain a profit; 4) Sore Losers: clicks that are made by an individual or a bot
to cause intentional costs to a competitor; and 5) Badware: clicks arising from an adware or
pop up ad program that essentially tricks a user to click into unwanted territory. SEAN
HARVEY, INVALID CLICKS AND ONLINE ADVERTISING, DOUBLE CLICK WHITE PAPER 1 (April
2007), available at http://www.doubleclick.com/insight/pdfs/dc invalidclicks_0704.pdf.
See supra note 15 (information on Doubleclick, Inc.); see infra note 66 (detailing bots).
[Vol. 32
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Archrival Company #2 wants to undermine Company #1's advertising
revenue in an attempt to become number one in the industry. Company #2
hires an "employee" to click Company #1's sponsored link on Google all
day, every day.61 Eventually, Company #1's ad disappears because it has
run out of paid clicks. Company #2 prevails and Company #1 loses its ad-
vertising, customers, and revenue without having a single valid customer
visit its website.62
Click fraud also affects AdSense. Individual publishers make a percen-
tage of profit per-click through AdSense.63 To increase revenues, dishonest
publishers may click on the advertisements on their own web pages to in-
crease their profits.64 By clicking on the ads, publishers increase the popu-
larity of their site, which in turn increases the PPC, and thus increases reve-
nues for the publisher.65
In some situations, hackers have compromised computers and installed
programs ("clickbots" or "bots") to automatically log false clicks on hun-
dreds of thousands of Google advertisements each minute.66 This method of
click fraud eliminates PPC budgets instantaneously.
3. Google's Attempt at Combating Click Fraud
Although click fraud is not per se illegal, its deceptive nature and dis-
honest accrual of profits presents the illusion of a criminal offense. To pro-
tect its customers against click fraud, Google has imposed three major de-
61. Click fraud has a thriving underground where publishers hire people outside their
"company" to click ads in their free time as a means of supplementing their income. Daswani
et al., supra note 18, at §§ 11.4.1-4.1.2. Hiring clickers increases revenues and makes click
fraud more difficult to detect by using HTTP proxies to act as an intermediary between a
user's machine and a website. Id. at § 11.4.1.2. Individual, international clickers earn thou-
sands of dollars engaging in click fraud. Id.
62. The PPC system may be compared to buying arcade tokens. A customer pays $20
for 20 tokens. Every game played costs a token; to play extra games the customer must pur-
chase additional tokens.
63. TuziuLIN,supra note 22, at §§ 10-12.
64. Id.
65. See VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 115-16.
66. A clickbot is a software robot that clicks on ads by issuing HTTP requests for adver-
tiser web pages with the intent to commit click fraud. Daswani et al., supra note 18, at §
11.4.2. Clickbots can be custom-built or purchased and can be manually installed or spread
online, similar to internet viruses. Id. A bot is able to disguise its location by falsifying refer-
ence points on the Internet to make it appear that clicks derived from different sources. Pay-
day Advance Plus, Inc. v. Findwhat.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A
"black market" of bots exists where hundreds, thousands, or hundreds of thousands of com-
puters can be hired for criminal activities, acting under control of the perpetrator without the
owner's knowledge. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 4, at 575.
2010]
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fenses: detection and filtering techniques, advanced monitoring techniques,
and the Google Click Quality Team.67
a. Detection and filtering
Google's detection and filtering techniques examine each click on an
AdWords ad for data points, such as the IP address,68 the time of the click,
any duplicate clicks, and various other click patterns.69 The system then
analyzes the data points and attempts to isolate and filter potentially invalid
clicks before they count as a PPC action.7°
b. Advanced monitoring techniques
Additionally, Google works to detect invalid clicks so that they may be
identified before an advertiser is billed.71 Google uses real-time filtering and
offline analysis to meet these objectives. 72 Catching clicks in real-time al-
lows Google to filter the clicks so that it appears to advertisers as though
they never occurred. 73 The real-time net filters a specific profile of invalid
behavior, such as excessively repetitive clicks or clicks and impressions
from known sources of invalid activity.74 Not all the clicks that are removed
can be classified as fraudulent clicks, but they may be deemed questiona-
ble-the clicker may have a malicious or impure intent to profit from the
click.75
67. Google AdWords Help: How Does Google Detect Invalid Clicks?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6114 (last visited Mar. 8,
2009) [hereinafter AdWords Help]. See generally TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at §§ 21-44;
Daswani, et al., supra note 18, at § 11.5.2.
68. See supra note 39 (defining IP address).
69. AdWords Help, supra note 67. See also TUZHILIN, supra note 22, at §§ 21-44; Das-
wani, et al., supra note 18, at § 11.5.2.
70. AdWords Help, supra note 67.
71. Kevin Newcomb, Google Offers More Click Fraud Data, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH,
Mar. 1, 2007, http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=3625137. Search Engine
Watch is a leading website for timely news and information regarding search engine action.
VISE & MALSEED, supra note 16, at 83. Search Engine Watch originated at approximately the
same time as Google, and has followed the search engine extensively. Id.
72. See generally TuzHLIN, supra note 22, at §§ 23, 35; Daswani, et al., supra note 18,
at§ 11.5.2.
73. Shuman Ghosemajumder, Business Product Manager for Trust and Safety of
Google, Inc., stated that "when we proactively remove these clicks, we forego a significant
amount of revenue. We're providing hundreds of millions of dollars in proactive protection."
Newcomb, supra note 71. Every one percent of clicks removed proactively would equate to
$100 million in lost annual revenue for Google. Id.
74. AdWords Help, supra note 67.
75. Newcomb, supra note 71.
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c. Google's Click Quality Team
Offline analysis-click inspection after a click is recorded-is another
proactive detection technique executed by Google's Click Quality Team
("the Team").76 Clicks detected during offline analysis are not billed to the
advertiser, but they still show up on advertisers' monthly click revenue da-
ta.
77
The Click Quality Team was created in 2004 as a self-regulating de-
vice.78 The Team's continuing goal is to make invalid click activity difficult
and unrewarding for unethical users. 79 The Team continues to implement
and apply strategies designed to help advertisers to report suspected click
fraud and block Google from serving ads to specific IP addresses, as well as
creating and using new anti-click fraud technology.80 Additionally, Google
refunds its advertisers for invalid clicks that are initially undetected by the
company.81 In 2007, Google estimated its click fraud percentage to be less
than ten percent of all clicks.82
Despite Google's attempts, critics argue that Google has not con-
fronted click fraud head-on because allowing click fraud actually enables
Google to profit in the short-term.83 For every ad falsely clicked, Google
gets paid. Google denies the accusations and claims that it is improving its
anti-click fraud policies but cannot be excessively transparent regarding its





78. Inside AdWords: Google AdWords: Meet the Click Quality Team,
http://adwords.blogspot.com/2007/02/meet-click-quality-team.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2009) Inside AdWords is Google's official blog for news, information, and tips on AdWords.
79. AdWords Help, supra note 67.
80. See TuzHILIN,supra note 22, at § 21.
81. Google AdWords Help: How Will Google Credit My Account For Invalid Clicks?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.pyanswer=6426&topic=10625 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2009).
82. Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.5.3. Google's click fraud statistics may vary
from third-party statistics because they define invalid clicks differently, leading to inconsis-
tent results. Id. at § 11.6.2.
83. Andy Greenberg, Clicks That Count, FORBES.COM, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/21/google-click-fraud-advertising-tech-cx-ag_092l cuthbert.
html (interviewing Tom Cuthbert, Chief Executive of Click Forensics, see infra note 87).
84. "Fraudster" is a term of art used by Google, technology experts, the news media,
and technology experts to describe the individuals or bots engaged in click fraud. See gener-
ally Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11 (discussing fraudsters throughout).
85. Id. at § 11.5.1.
2010]
UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
4. Independent click fraud consultants
Search engines, publishers, and clickers all unduly profit from click
fraud. Recognizing the need for third-party, unbiased click fraud data, inde-
pendent consulting firms are beginning to materialize. Click Facts, a San
Francisco-based consultant, works to protect advertising network providers
and online advertising buyers from malicious web attacks in an attempt to
make digital advertising safer.86 Click Forensics, an Austin-based click
fraud consultant, tracks and monitors data gathered from its Click Fraud
Index, a network of more than 4,000 online advertisers and agencies. 87 The
Click Fraud Network provides statistical PPC data collected from advertis-
ing campaigns, large and small, across all the leading search engines. 88 In
the fourth quarter of 2008, Click Forensics reported that the overall industry
click fraud average rate was 17.1%.89 Click Forensics also reported that the
methods used to commit click fraud, such as an increase in clickbot Web
traffic, have become increasingly more sophisticated and difficult to
detect.90
5. Alternative click fraud remedies
In addition to self-regulatory efforts and private consulting, various
civil legal theories have been used to address the problem of click fraud.91
In July 2006, Google reached a $90 million settlement with a class of unsa-
tisfied AdWords advertising customers in Texarkana, Arkansas.92 The class
in Lane's Gifts v. Yahoo!, Inc. and Google Inc. alleged breach of contract
86. Click Facts: About Click Facts, http://www.clickfacts.com/about.htnil (last visited
Jan. 25, 2009).
87. Click Forensics: Traffic Quality Management: Click Fraud Index,




91. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Lane's Gifts and Collectibles v. Ya-
hoo!, Inc. and Google, Inc., No. CV-2005-52-1 (Cir. Ct. Miller County, Ark. Feb. 17, 2005);
Press Release, Department of Justice, United States Attorney Kevin V. Ryan, Daly City Man
Indicted in "Click Fraud" Scheme (Mar. 29, 2006) (on file with note author).
92. Final Order and Judgment Approving Settlement, Certifying Class for Settlement
Purposes, Awarding Class Counsel Attorneys' Fees and Dismissing Action with Prejudice at
7, Lane's Gifts, No. CV-2005-52-1. The class action was initially filed in the Miller County
Circuit Court before being filed in federal court by a local Arkansas business, Lane's Gifts
and Collectibles. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, supra note 91. The action targeted
big name search engines like Yahoo!, Google, and America Online for excessive advertising
charges based on fraudulent clicks. Id. Because the interstate class action was of national
importance, it was later filed in federal court to secure a fairer outcome pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-14 (2000).
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under the terms of the pay per click agreement, unjust enrichment, and civil
93conspiracy.
While Lane's Gifts was being decided, Advanced Internet Technolo-
gies, Inc. (AIT), v. Google, Inc. was granted a stay request for their action
alleging breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and unfair busi-
ness practices relating to click fraud.94 The Lane's Gifts parties settled;
therefore, no precedent was created.95 The AlT case was dismissed as a re-
sult.
96
In June 2009, Microsoft filed a click fraud action against three Cana-
dian residents97 in the federal District Court for the Western District of
Washington.98 Microsoft is the first corporation to file a click fraud suit,
creating a new scenario where the company, not a consumer, is the "vic-
tim." Microsoft alleged a massive click fraud scheme on an online advertis-
ing network operated by the company, citing breach of contract; breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; tortious interference with a
business relationship; fraudulent concealment; fraudulent misrepresentation;
civil conspiracy; 99 and violations of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 00 the Washington Computer Spyware Act,'0' and the Washington
Consumer Protection Act. 10 2 Microsoft realized false clicks were being
logged under the guise of multiple IP addresses for specific searches target-
93. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, supra note 91.
94. Jury Trial Demanded, Click Defense v. Google, No. C05-02579, 2005 WL 1687517
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 2005). Google sought a stay because the outcome of the Lane's Gifts
settlement would have a significant impact on the A!T case. See Order Regarding Stay Re-
quest, Advanced Internet Techs. v. Google, Nos. C-05-02579 RMW, C-05-02885 RMW
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006); Stipulation and Order, Advanced Internet Techs. v. Google, Inc.,
C-05-02579 RMW, C-05-02885 RMW, 2006 WL 889477 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006). The
court reasoned that the preclusive effect of the Arkansas litigation could substantially affect
the number of class members with viable claims against Google. Id. The court determined
that proceeding with the California case under the circumstances would be a waste of judicial
resources, as progress in the Arkansas suit could require the court to revisit any ruling made
on the AIT motion. Id. As a result of the Lane's Gifts settlement, the A/T case was dismissed.
95. Final Order and Judgment Approving Settlement, Lane's Gifts and Collectibles v.
Yahoo!, Inc. and Google, Inc., No. CV-2005-52-1 (Cir. Ct. of Ark. Miller County, Ark. Apr.
30, 2008).
96. Stipulation and Order, Advanced Internet Techs. v. Google, Inc., C-05-02579
RMW, C-05-02885 RMW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006).
97. Eric Lam, Melanie Suen, and Gordon Lam of Vancouver, British Columbia. Com-
plaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Microsoft Corp. v. Lam, C09-0815 (June 15,
2009).
98. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Microsoft Corp. v. Lam, supra note
97.
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). See also infra Part IJI.C.2.
101. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.270.010 et seq. (West 2008).




ing automobile insurance and World of Warcraft, an online role playing
game. 10 3 If the Microsoft case goes to trial, it will create an important
precedent and foundation for the future regulation of electronic crime. Mi-
crosoft seeks injunctive relief, $750,000 in compensatory damages, and
other fees and damages.'14
There have also been governmental attempts at click fraud enforce-
ment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has launched investigations in
coordination with a specialized unit of Northern District of California Unit-
ed States Attorney's Office-the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Prop-
erty Unit (CHIP).'0 5 These agencies have attempted to prosecute domestic
click fraud under civil causes of action.1
0 6
Probably the most creative response to the click fraud problem is by-
passing search engines, litigation, consultants, and the government and
alerting a credit card company of a fraudulent charge based on a payment
for advertising. 0 7 This "solution" leaves it to the credit card company to
sort out the overcharge; however, it does not resolve the issue.
103. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 98 at T 27. Defendants
allegedly registered for four Microsoft advertising accounts. Id. Microsoft credited automo-
tive insurance and World of Warcraft advertisers $1.5 million for losses sustained from click
fraud, and Lam, as an "advertiser" received his share after lodging a complaint. Id. at 9 35.
Although Lam may have requested and received a credit in an attempt to look innocent,
Microsoft linked Lam to the click fraud scheme by tracing the false click IP addresses to
computers or servers operated or registered by Eric Lam. Id. at 33. Lam used the computers
to sell World of Warcraft gold. Id, at 1 33.
104. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 98 at %9 89-96.
105. Press Release, Department of Justice, supra note 91. A California man was indicted
by a federal grand jury for using a source code obtained by his employer to develop a click-
bot to fraudulently generate points from an Internet click fraud scheme by clicking on adver-
tisements, completing consumer surveys, and making online purchases. Id. He later used the
points to buy products from Internet retailers. Id. The man was charged with conspiracy, mail
fraud, and wire fraud. Id.
106. Id. Unlike the other Northern District of California U.S. Attorney Criminal divisions
which are based out of San Francisco, the CHIP unit is based in San Jose, California near the
heart of Silicon Valley. Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section: United States De-
partment of Justice, Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Program,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/chips.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). The San
Jose CHIP Unit became a model for ten additional CHIP unit programs featuring an effort by
prosecutors, the FBI, and other agencies to establish relationships and encourage law en-
forcement interaction with technology companies and individuals. The United States Attor-
ney's Office Northern District of California: Divisions,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/divisions/criminal.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
107. Adam Penenberg, Click Fraud: Problem and Paranoia, WIRED.COM, Mar. 10, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2005/03/66845. Wired is a magazine and web-
site dedicated to providing timely technology news and information to readers.
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I1. PROPOSAL
Click fraud may be combated through several different approaches-
civil causes of action, criminal statutes, search engine self-regulation ef-
forts, or third party involvement. Click fraud must be resolved in a court of
law rather than through the course of business dealings. 10 8 Treating click
fraud as a civil wrong allows advertisers to recoup false advertising charges
and receive restitution, making amends but not correcting the problem. With
the advent of the Internet as a primary commerce tool, restitution may not
be enough. Electronic commerce must occur in a reliable and trustworthy
setting; click fraud disrupts this goal. Applying criminal penalties to click
fraud would punish such behavior and deter it in the future. Involving
search engines and third party efforts would provide enforcement and tech-
nical expertise that otherwise may not be available.
A. The Legal Challenges of Click Fraud
The concept of fraudulent clicks is difficult to understand, difficult to
track, and difficult to classify under law.109 Furthermore, it is difficult for
plaintiffs to demonstrate how and why clicks are fraudulent and that actual
legal injury or economic harm occurred."0 This may be the reason general
civil causes of action are used to circumvent the click fraud issue-
recognizing a breach of contract may be easier than introducing the concept
of click fraud. Proving a fraudulent click is difficult because there is not
one, true definition-there is no accepted industry standard constituting a
fraudulent click."'
Determining who should be responsible for the alleged fraud is another
major issue. While search engines are the easiest party to target, click fraud
may be perpetrated by a number of individuals or parties!1 2 A search engine
forges a contract with an advertiser and sets the terms of a PPC arrange-
108. See EIC GOLDMAN, CLICK FRAUD, 20TH ANNUAL TECHNOLOGY AND COMPUTER
LAW CONFERENCE, CLICK FRAUD 22 (May 24-25, 2007), available at
http://www.ericgoldman.org/Resources/clickfraudblogposts.pdf [hereinafter GOLDMAN,
CLICK FRAUD CONFERENCE].
109. Telephone interview with Michael Caruso, CEO of Clickfacts (Nov. 11, 2008). See
generally discussion supra Part II.C.4 for more information about Clickfacts.
110. Telephone interview with Michael Caruso, supra note 109.
111. Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.6.2. Third party consultants may find a differ-
ent percentage of fraudulent clicks than a search engine in a given period because of the
method and definition used in determining valid clicks. Id. Auditing companies are not privy
to information regarding what clicks search engines actually charge for, so they may have to
make an educated guess at what may or may not be valid. Id.
112. Telephone interview with Stephen Malouf, plaintiffs' lead counsel for the Lane's
Gifts case, Law Firm of Stephen Malouf (Nov. 2008).
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ment." 3 The search engine, however, is not the party logging the fraudulent
click. 14 The actual fraudulent click is made by a clicker or a bot; unfortu-
nately, these parties are difficult to identify and track down because of the
anonymity of the Internet. 1 5 Until the issue of click fraud was first identi-
fied, search engines had no need to track clicks, measure metrics or conver-
sion rates, worry about abuse of the system, or wonder if they were uninten-
tionally overcharging advertising fees."
6
Widespread regulation is needed because click fraud is an international
issue and the current methods of circumventing click fraud are too broad.' 
17
Standard and predictable click-fraud provisions are necessary for deterrence
and remedy. It is important to evaluate the legal framework in which click
fraud regulation may occur." 8 The United States court system has not set a
precedent for click fraud, nor does any law specifically mention its exis-
tence. 119 Search engines have become more self-regulated, 120 but this may
not be enough. Click fraud must be combated to protect consumers, main-
tain the effectiveness of online advertising, and encourage future e-
commerce development.
B. Analysis of Click Fraud Combat Approaches: Civil Theories
Eric Goldman, noted technology law expert, questioned the attachment
of the civil conspiracy cause of action in the Lane's Gifts case.' 21 This is a
conmon cause of action in Arkansas in contract cases. In Faulkner v. Ar-
kansas Children's Hospital, 122 civil conspiracy was defined as "two or more
persons combined to accomplished a purpose that is unlawful or oppressive
or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself unlawful, oppressive, or im-
113. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
114. See discussion supra Part H.C.2.
115. See supra note 60.
116. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
117. See Daswani et al., supra note 18, at § 11.4.1. Instances of false clickers and click-
bots have been identified in South Korea, Egypt, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Mongolia, Vietnam, and Honduras. Brian Grow & Ben Elgin with Moira Herbst, Click
Fraud- The Dark Side of Advertising, BusINEss WEEK, Oct. 2, 2006, at 46, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_40/b4003001.htm; Brian Grow, Doing
Business with a Controversial Partner, BuSINESS WEEK, Oct. 2, 2006, at 57, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_40/b4003012.htm.
118. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
119. See, e.g., NetQuote, Inc. v. Byrd, No. 07-cv-00630-DME-MEH, 2008 WL 2552871,
at * 14 (D. Colo. June 17, 2008) (holding that "there is no indication that Georgia has adopted
the tort of 'click fraud"').
120. AdWords Help, supra note 67. See also discussion supra Part I1.C.3.
121. See GOLDMAN, CLICK FRAuD CONFERENCE, supra note 108. See also Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 91.
122. 347 Ark. 941,69 S.W.3d 393 (2002).
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moral, but by unlawful, oppressive, or immoral means, to the injury of
another." Civil conspiracy is not actionable in and of itself, but it allows
recovery of damages caused by acts committed pursuant to the conspira-
cy. 123 Goldman compares civil conspiracy to antitrust and competition law,
stating that taking an antitrust approach in opposing click fraud may raise
the stakes for search engines.1 24 Antitrust infers a conspiracy in a market
relationship. 125 Combating click fraud through the Sherman Antitrust Act
would ensure click fraud's illegality and apply stiff penalties.
26
Many of the civil claims against advertising overcharges have focused
on fraudulent behavior. Common law fraud, however, is a generic term, and
direct evidence of fraud may be difficult to obtain. 27 The only way to dem-
onstrate that fraud has occurred is by keeping rationally and consistently
developed, documented, and implemented records of alleged fraudulent
activity.
21
Generally, contract law and business dealings allow for restitution, but
do not deter incidents of future misconduct. If the goal of legal action for
click fraud is to get advertisers' money back, civil means are sufficient. If
the goal is to prevent, deter, and punish those responsible for click fraud,
however, criminal penalties must be applied.
C. Analysis of Click Fraud Combat Approaches: Criminal Theories
As Internet technology evolves in the absence of enforcement and reg-
ulation, click fraud will become more prevalent. 29 There are currently state
and federal criminal statutes relating to theft and fraud,130 but these statutes
123. Id.
124. See GOLDMAN, CLICK FRAUD CONFERENCE, supra note 108.
125. Id.
126. The Sherman Antitrust Act states, in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not ex-
ceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the dis-
cretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
127. BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANE K. WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 11.01
(3d ed.1998).
128. Id. at§ 11.02.
129. Telephone interview with Michael Caruso, supra note 109.
130. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-36-104, 106 (LEXIS Repl.
2006); id. § 5-37-101.
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may not be specific enough to target click fraudsters. Nevertheless, they
may still be more effective than civil claims in combating click fraud.
1. State Criminal Theft and Fraud Statutes
Sections 5-41-201 through -206 of the Arkansas Code detail criminal
penalties for computer crimes. 3 ' Furthermore, sections 5-36-104, -106, and
5-37-101 provide for instances of general theft and fraud. Other states have
similar statutes. 32 While click fraud may be interpreted to fall within the
language of these state statutes, there is a question of who should prosecute
the matter-the state or the federal government. Although States may be
able to spend more time on the problem, the nature of the crime appears to
require federal involvement, which has typically been implemented in other
internet crimes.133
2. The Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,' 34 amended as recently as 2008,
concerns computer fraud and related activity and applies punishment for
unauthorized computer hacking. 35 The statute, which does not specifically
address click fraud, states that "[w]hoever intentionally accesses a protected
computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes
damage and loss" may be punished by varying degrees of fines or impri-
sonment.' 136 A "protected computer" is defined as "a computer which is
used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, in-
cluding a computer located outside the United States that is used in a man-
ner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the
131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-202 details penalties for unlawful acts regarding computers.
It is illegal for a person to knowingly and without authorization modify, damage, destroy,
disclose, use, transfer, conceal, take, retain possession of, copy, obtain or attempt to obtain
access to, permit access to or cause to be accessed, or enter data or a program that exists
inside or outside a computer, system, or network, among other things. Id. It is a felony to
commit these acts as part of a scheme or devise to illegally obtain property. Id. § 5-41-
202(b)(2)(A).
132. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-103 (West 2009); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
31.03 (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.030 (West 2009) (covering theft and fraud gener-
ally). See also, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601 et seq. (West 2009); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 33.02 (West 2009) (covering computer crimes specifically).
133. See infra Parts 111.2, 3, and 4.
134. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(West 2009)). The act was passed as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Id.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West 2009).
136. Id. §§ 1030(a)(5)(C), (c).
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United States."' 37 It appears that this provision could be interpreted to in-
clude fraudulent clicks made by clickbots, which would enable criminal
penalties to be applied to fraudsters.
38
In I.MS. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire Information
Systems, Inc.,139 the court held that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act pro-
vision forbidding obtaining information from a protected computer involved
in interstate and foreign commerce applied to private actions because there
was alleged fraud or loss.' 40 This holding supports application of federal
law, even though the click fraud dispute may be between private parties.
3. The Wire Fraud Act
The Wire Fraud Act14' has also been used to punish fraud on the Inter-
net. The Act states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or ar-
tifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, trans-
mits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or televi-
sion communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writ-
ings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of execut-
ing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or impri-
soned not more than 20 years, or both.
142
In United States v. Blanchett, the defendants fraudulently received
$34,000 by selling nonexistent computer equipment on eBay, an Internet
auction site. 43 The penalty for the defendants' acts was enhanced because
they attempted to defraud more than one victim using mass marketing.'
44
Similarly in United States v. Pirello, the court held that an enhanced penalty
for mass marketing was appropriate when a defendant defrauded consumers
by placing a classified advertisement for computers on an Internet bulletin
board.
45
137. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
138. This has not been confirmed by legislative history or case law, however, because the
specific crime of click fraud is nearly nonexistent in the current legal provisions or decisions.
139. 307 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
140. Id.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (West 2009).
142. Id.
143. 41 F. App'x 181, 2002 WL511745 (10th Cir. 2002).
144. Id.
145. 255 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2001). The Pirello dissent questions the interpretation of the
phrases "mass-marketing" and "solicitation" as they are used by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in determining an appropriate punishment for wire fraud. Id. at 733 (Benzon, J.,
dissenting). Circuit Judge Benzon suggests that solicitation is a one-on-one act which cannot
2010]
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These examples of wire fraud used advertising to defraud consumers of
money, which is also the primary goal of click fraud-although it obtains
the money through more advanced technological means. If criminal penal-
ties can be applied to selling computer parts that do not exist, they should
also be applied to fraudulent clicks which falsely charge advertisers.
4. The Unlawful Gambling Enforcement Act
Additional Internet regulation can also be found in The Unlawful In-
ternet Gambling Enforcement Act, 46 which bars businesses from knowing-
ly accepting payments in connection with unlawful Internet gambling and
prohibits gambling websites from turning any computer into a casino.
147
The Act uses agencies and commissions to enforce Internet crime and pro-
mote public welfare-an approach that may be effective in combating click
fraud.
148
D. Miscellaneous Click Fraud Combat Approaches
Individual Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may take a stand against
click fraud. An ISP acted as an independent regulator by denying Internet
access to a company who provided a safe haven for Internet spam groups
and for its "misuse" of the Internet.1 49 While this approach may not deter
click fraud extensively, it can act as a delay tactic until state or federal sanc-
tions are applied or another solution arises.
E. Guidelines for a Solution
Although existing civil and criminal approaches may be used to com-
bat click fraud, Internet technology is rapidly changing. A click fraud solu-
tion must use and execute existing standards of law in a flexible and un-
precedented manner, expanding the scope of enforcement to include not
only the government, but search engines, private industry, and the public
sector as well.
be done in mass form via the Internet and notes that common media forms of advertising,
such as radio, television, and Internet, are not mentioned in the Federal Guidelines. Id. at
733-34.
146. Codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (West 2009).
147. 12 C.F.R. §§ 233.1-233.7 (2008). The Act was officially instituted by the United
States Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve on November 12, 2008. Id. Internet
gambling companies have until December 1, 2009, to comply with the rule. Id.
148. Id.
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1. Regulation of Electronic Markets
The principles of electronic market regulation must be considered in
implementing click fraud regulation. The goal of e-commerce regulation is
to promote a fair market, which does not occur by overcharging for adver-
tising based on fraudulent clicks or enabling clicks to generate income for
malicious causes. 150 Several factors to consider in applying regulation in-
clude: 1) whether a market is open; 2) whether regulation can be abused to
mislead or take advantage of anyone; 3) whether regulation can handle trad-
ing reliability; and 4) whether regulators have jurisdiction of the market." 1
Regulation must be facilitated on a global basis and in a manner that
does not hinder technological advancement. 152 The Internet market changes
daily. 53 When the market changes, the application of the law must either be
reassessed or be flexible enough to bridge the change. 154 Electronic markets
are characterized by faster dissemination of information, greater trading
volume, diversity, and geographic dispersal. 155 Any attempt to regulate click
fraud must take ever-changing technological characteristics into account.
2. Enhanced Search Engine Self-Regulation Efforts
Stephen Malouf, plaintiffs lead counsel for the Lane's Gifts case,
stated that search engines seem to do a good job with self regulation. 56 Ma-
louf questioned the necessity for outside regulation, stating that legislation
would most likely use "reasonable efforts" as a quantitative term.'57 At-
tempting to prove reasonable efforts in court would be a "litigation night-
mare" because it becomes a factual question of clicker's intent.'58
Enhanced self-regulation efforts, however, may help in prosecuting
click fraud. 159 The problem with litigation is that the intent to commit click
fraud is difficult to understand and prove. 160 A search engine, however, may
150. WRIGHT& WINN, supra note 127, at § 18.01.
151. Id.
152. Id. at § 4.04. Additionally, Internet companies cannot be regulated like other com-
panies. Google insisted on gaining monetary backing on its own terms. VISE & MALSEED,
supra note 16, at 62. Google also insisted on the terms of its initial public stock offering. Id.
at 171-72. Google cannot be hemmed in by a regulatory, general structure; in doing so, its
creativity and innovation is constricted. Regulation must occur without putting creativity in a
box.
153. WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 127, at § 4.04.
154. Id. at§§ 18.01-18.02.
155. Id. at§ 18.02.
156. Telephone interview with Stephen Malouf, supra note 112.
157. Id.
158. Id.




be able to collect click data which could be used to help determine clicker
intent.16 1 Google's Click Quality Team collects information about invalid
clicks and analyzes click activity.' 62 Mandated search engine protocol for
obtaining and publishing data would help avail information for litigation-
transparency would increase and the burden of proving intent would de-
crease. 1
63
3. Third Party Involvement: Private Industry and Public Sector
Efforts
Third-party involvement may come in the form of public sector or pri-
vate entity involvement in educational opportunities, consulting, auditing,
and general awareness efforts. Private entity efforts regarding click fraud
currently exist as those in the Internet business recognize the challenges of
the electronic market.' 64 The Internet Advertising Bureau (lAB), which has
been working toward click fraud management for two years, 165 was founded
in 1996 with the goal of growing the interactive advertising marketplace;
educating marketers, agencies, media companies, and the wider business
community about the value of interactive advertising; evaluating and re-
commending standards and practices; and fielding research on interactive
advertising. 66 An organization such as LAB 16 may aid in the enforcement
of click fraud or serve as an advisory committee for regulatory efforts. 68 On
the other hand, a regulatory committee composed solely of those in the
marketplace, including possible offenders, may actually hinder progress in
combating click fraud.
The public sector, in contrast, may not know the obstacles that click
fraud presents. The public sector, including advertisers using PPC pro-
grams, has typically accepted the ramifications attached to false clicks.' 69
As the economy becomes weaker, however, every dollar will count and
advertisers will be more apt to question Internet advertising billing practic-
161. Id.
162. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.c. See also Newcomb, supra note 71.
163. Transparency may include publishing false click data, search engine auditing, click
quality control reporting, or any other method of making click fraud information and combat




166. IAB.net, About the lAB, http://www.iab.net/about-the-iab (last visited Jan. 24,
2009).
167. lAB is comprised of more than 375 leading media and technology companies re-
sponsible for selling eighty-six percent of online advertising in the United States. Id.
168. Id.
169. Telephone interview with Michael Caruso, supra note 109.
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es. 170 This, in turn, will most likely garner media attention, thereby inform-
ing the general public about the dangers of click fraud.'1
7
Consumer awareness of click fraud poses additional legal considera-
tions. Buying Internet advertising is a voluntary activity, and buying it
knowing that click fraud is a possibility could be construed as a waiver if
litigation were to ensue.172 As e-commerce continues to evolve, however,
there might not truly be a choice to forego online advertising opportunities,
creating a defense to a waiver agreement.
73
a. Education
Education aids current and future online advertisers in understanding
the risk of click fraud. As a result of the Lane's Gifts settlement and the A/T
case, certain private companies and individuals have rallied to educate the
masses. For instance, Lostclicks.com is a website dedicated to informing
consumers about the hazards of click fraud and recruiting members for the
Lane's Gifts class action suit.' 74
Based on the educational premise, click fraud consulting has gained
credibility and popularity. Third-party groups like Click Facts and Click
Forensics conduct research to determine the effects of click fraud. 175 Con-
sultants act as a search engine industry watchdog in ensuring that search
engines fulfill their self-regulatory actions. These consulting firms also help
legal counsel understand click fraud and its effects when preparing for trial
or settlement.
76
The future of consulting may evolve into a third party clearing house
model that will help regulate the click fraud industry by auditing click fraud
figures and taking the advertising details out of the search engine's hands.
177
For instance, Google will still run its AdWords program, but a third party
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See GOLDMAN, CLICK FRAUD CONFERENCE, supra note 108.
173. Id.
174. Bill Hartzer, Lost Clicks, SEARCH ENGINE GUIDE, May 27, 2005,
http://www.searchengineguide.com/bill-hartzer/004579.html. Search Engine Guide is the
definitive guide to search engine information on the Internet. Lostclicks.com was originally
built to recruit class members for Lane's Gifts, but later became a hub for click fraud infor-
mation. See Lostclicks, http://lostclicks.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
175. See Clickfacts, http://www.clickfacts.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2009); Click Foren-
sics, http://www.clickforensics.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
176. See Clickfacts, supra note 175; Click Forensics, supra note 175.
177. Jeff Martin, Click Fraud Case to Stay in Arkansas, VERICLIX,
http://www.vericlix.com/200509 1_ppcfraudwatcharchive.html (referencing Stephen
Malouf s, (the plaintiffs' counsel in the Lane's Gifts case) belief that a third-party system is
the future of click fraud regulation in which PPC networks and advertisers would grant third
parties access to their data.)
2010]
UALR LAW REVIEW
clearing house would distribute the ads, collect the money for Google, and
monitor click fraud attempts.' 78 This model eliminates search engines'
temptation to allow click fraud.
b. Principles of Government Involvement
President Clinton and Vice President Gore created a Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce in 1997, which detailed five basic principles
in applying government regulation. 179 The principles include recognition
that: 1) the private sector should lead; 2) governments should avoid undue
restrictions on electronic commerce; 3) where governmental involvement is
needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist,
consistent and simple legal environment for commerce; 4) governments
should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet; and 5) electronic
commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis.'
80
President Obama released a Cyberspace Policy Review in 2009 follow-
ing a sixty-day comprehensive review of the existing state of cyber security
in the United States.' 8' The review compiled academic, private-sector, and
government perspectives to create a cyber security action plan.'8 2 The plan
is to be led by a Cybersecurity Czar, appointed by the President. 183 The Cy-
178. Id.
179. PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, JR., FRAMEWORK
FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (July 1, 1997),
http://isis.ku.dk/kurser/blob.aspx?feltid=196532 (recognizing that the Internet is being used
to reinvent government and reshape lives and communities, and determining that government
can aid in facilitating the growth of commerce on the Internet by taking certain actions).
180. Id.
181. Kim Zetter, Obama Says New Cyberczar Won't Spy on the Net, WIRED, May 29,
2009, http://www.wired.con/threatlevel/2OO9/05/netprivacy/; CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW
(May 29, 2009), available at
http://www.wired.com/images-blogs/threatlevel/2009/05/cyberspace-policyreview-final.pd
f.
182. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 181.
183. Kim Zetter, supra note 181. The Czar will be responsible for working with Congress
to establish a national cyber security strategy and facilitate policies among civilian, military,
and intelligence agencies. Ellen Nakashima, Top Cybersecurity Aide at White House Resigns,
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 4, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/03/AR2009080302697.htm
1. The appointment of the Czar was delayed, in lieu of the state of the national economy and
foreign policy, leading to the resignation of Melissa E. Hathaway, the White House senior
aide on Cybersecurity. Id. Hathaway served in this position since 2007 after being appointed
during the Bush Administration. Id. President Obarna's cyber security plans follow the Com-
prehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) implemented by the Bush Administra-
tion in January 2008. John Rollins & Anna C. Henning, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SYSTEM,
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE: LEGAL AuTHORITES AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS (MAR. 10, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40427.pdf. The CNCI
established a governmental approach to identifying current and emerging cyber threats,
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berspace Policy Review echoes the undertones of the Clinton and Gore
Framework, calling for awareness and education, a partnership between the
private sector and the government and the international community, and
encouraging innovation.'8 4
Additionally, the Department of Justice has suggested that the growth
of electronic commerce is likely to be encumbered if consumers have
doubts regarding the security of personal information they are entrusting to
electronic merchants. 185 The growth of e-commerce will be hindered if ad-
vertisers do not trust the online advertising system in place.
A national-level coordination with the Federal Trade Commission and
other agencies, as well as more locally oriented task forces or specialized
enforcement units, should work together to combat fraud and deception in
global e-commerce by using all available methods, including criminal sanc-
tions, civil penalties, and forfeiture.' 86 If the United States is to be success-
ful in addressing fraud in global e-commerce, it must do so by seeking co-
operative solutions with other countries.
187
An initiative against click fraud involving countries with Internet and
e-commerce structures similar to that of the United States may help success-
fully conquer click fraud.188 These countries may broaden their outreach by
systematically including other countries whose Internet usage may not pa-
rallel that of the United States.189
Because of the advanced technological nature of click fraud, the initia-
tive may include government officials and industry leaders within the coun-
try-l9 Because the Internet allows for anonymity and makes international
boundaries invisible, the existence of countries that tolerate or foster fraud
within their borders could undermine even the most carefully developed
multinational enforcement scheme. 191 Any approach should discourage, to
the greatest extent possible, the creation of fraud havens and encourage the
strengthening current and future telecommunications and cyber vulnerabilities, and respond-
ing to or proactively addressing entities that wish to steal or manipulate protected data on
secure federal systems. Id. The CNCI consisted of twelve "mostly" classified projects to
improve the defense of government computer networks. Nakashima, supra.
184. See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 181.
185. Letter from James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, to Mr. Donald Clark,
Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Perspectives on Consumer Protection in
the Global Electronic Marketplace C Comment, P994312, March 29, 1999 [hereinafter Ro-









maximum amount of information passed to consumers when they are deal-
ing with companies located in such countries. 92
An additional method to address the internationality of click fraud is to
use Mutual League Assistance Treaties (MLAT). 193 MLATs have been used
in the past where the United States has negotiated with various foreign
countries to provide a formal framework for obtaining information and evi-
dence for use in criminal law enforcement matters available only through
compulsory measures.194
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on current click fraud technology, search engine self-regulatory
measures, increased consumer knowledge, click fraud experts, opinions of
lawyers and legislators, the brief history of the issue in the court system, and
research regarding past Intemet-affiliated initiatives, the future of click
fraud lies in the swiftness and severity of action taken by coordinated efforts
of the public, private industry, and the government. A criminal solution
must be realistic, enforceable, forward-thinking, and widespread. It must be
narrow enough to encompass the specific nature of click fraud while re-
maining broad enough to allow companies, like Google, to continue to
create unhindered new technology.
A criminal solution must also be flexible enough to withstand constant
advancements, loopholes, and the unpredictable nature of the Internet. It
must change, yet remain standardized so that legal precedents and statutory
language may be applied to resolve legal disputes. Click fraud should be
attacked by alternative approaches--circumventing the issue through litiga-
tion instead of merely using civil causes of action that are not specifically
tailored. It is not the precise language of the federal criminal statutes that
will condemn click fraud, but rather the interpretation of those statutes.
Click fraud victims are entitled to restitution for their losses, but because of
the importance of e-commerce in our society, criminal sanctions are neces-
sary to promote the public welfare and deter future misconduct.
192. Id.
193. An MLAT is a legally binding treaty that creates obligations for supervisors to
exchange information on individuals and to assist in investigations undertaken by other au-
thorities. KERN ALEXANDER, ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 53 (2006).
194. Robinson, Letter to FTC, supra note 185.
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